What is Marriage? - Part 2

THE ATTACK ON MARRIAGE

80. Is Marriage, Christian Marriage, Appreciated At its True Value in the World Today?

It is not. Assaults are actually launched against it to ridicule and disparage it, to exalt the vices that violate its sanctity, and to substitute in its place monstrous unions which are more in accord with what is called the "modern mind," that is the spirit which denies the Faith and the morality founded on Faith, under the pretext of "emancipating itself from ancient prejudices."

81. How Are These Errors Propagated?

By all the channels of publicity which science places at the disposal of every one: by books, not only obscene or subtly suggestive novels, but works that pretend to be scientific; by newspapers and magazines, text and illustration; by theaters, movies, the radio; by official propaganda as well as by advice given openly or under cover.

These thoughts are instilled into men of every class, rich and poor, workers and masters, lettered and unlettered, married and single, the godly and the godless, old and young, but for these last, as easier prey, the worst snares are laid?

82. Do All the Adversaries of the Doctrine of Christian Marriage Go to These Extremes?

As in all errors, there are in this matter extremists and moderates; and the more moderate errors themselves admit of various degrees. As a matter of fact, it is the moderates who do the most harm, because they give less alarm and thus succeed more readily in seducing the mind and effecting a transition which paves the way for the worst excesses.

The most moderate are those who, whilst they retain in theory the moral principles relating to marriage, believe that in practice certain concessions should be made to human weakness, that certain difficulties should be met by compromise.

Not all the sponsors of these new doctrines are carried to the extremes of unbridled lust. There are those who, striving as it were to ride a middle course, believe, nevertheless, that something should be conceded in our time as regards certain precepts of the Divine and natural law. But these likewise, more or less wittingly, are emissaries of the great enemy who is ever seeking to sow cockle among the wheat?

83. Whence Comes This Ungrateful Attitude Toward an Order Which Is so Beautiful, so Alluring to All the Higher Tendencies of Man?

It is deeply rooted in atheistic materialism, which is fatally blinded to whatever is above the things of the senses and of earth; in sensualism which mistakes sensual pleasure for happiness and governs everything by the dictates of the lower appetites; in a spineless education which no longer concerns itself with self-conquest; in a disregard of the Cross of Christ, which makes satisfaction instead of duty the absolute standard. Corrupted by these evil influences, man has forgotten how to look up, how to restrain his passions, how to practice the self-denial, at times heroic, which right conduct demands. The message of Christian doctrine is: Lift up your hearts! It says: Master your appetites. It preaches the Cross, and denial of self. It demands faith in Jesus crucified.

"If any one wants to understand marriage, he must first understand Christ; and whoever wants to understand Christ must know the meaning of the Cross."

84. What Are the Sources of These Evils According to the Encyclical?

Their basic principle lies in this, that matrimony is repeatedly declared to be not instituted by the Author of nature nor raised by Christ the Lord to the dignity of a true Sacrament, but invented by man. Some confidently assert that they have found no evidence for the existence of matrimony in nature or in her laws, but regard it merely as the means of producing life and of gratifying in me way or another a vehement impulse. On the other hand, others recognize that certain beginnings, or as it were seeds, of true wedlock are found in the nature of man, since, unless men were bound together by some form of permanent tie, the dignity of husband and wife or the natural end of propagating and rearing the offspring would not receive satisfactory provision, at the same time they maintain that in all beyond this germinal idea matrimony, through various concurrent causes, is invented solely by the mind of man, established solely by his will.

85. What Are the Logical Consequences of This Doctrine?

That the laws and morals of marriage are variable, according to prevailing ideas and the shifting circumstances of human affairs; that the generative power has a wider range than matrimony; and hence that it may be exercised outside as well as within the confines of wedlock.

86. What Are the Aberrations of the Conjugal Union Which Are Here Condemned By the Holy Father?

The Holy Father repudiates in the name of Catholic morality, or rather in the name of natural morality: temporary marriages, contracted only for a definite time, for example whilst the parties live in a certain country or are engaged in a certain enterprise; trial marriages, entered upon as a provisional experiment; companionate marriages, based on a so-called friendship which claims the most intimate relations, but insists on their remaining unfruitful.

Whilst he condemns these enormities, the Holy Father is even more severe against the effrontery of those who insist that these monstrosities be legitimatized by law or at least legally tolerated.

THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE CHILD

87. What Is the First Assault Upon the Child Which Is Branded bt the Encyclical?

The Encyclical brands in the first place the base selfishness and the audacious lie of many who dare to call the child "the disagreeable burden of matrimony"; it brands the "criminal abuse" of those who avoid children by frustrating the marriage act, whether they wish to gratify their passions without the consequent burden, or whether they excuse themselves on the ground of two concurrent impossibilities: that they cannot on the one hand remain continent, nor on the other have children. This last impossibility is claimed to exist either because of personal difficulties, or the condition of the mother, or family circumstances.

88. What Does the Holy Father, Say to These Excuses?

He rejects them all at one sweep by reminding us: No reason, however grave, may be put forward by which anything intrinsically against nature may become conformable to nature and morally good. Conjugal relations debased in this way are nothing more than "a form of debauchery which the world has come to look upon as regular and permissible."

89. How Does He Demonstrate the Absolute Opposition of These Practices to the Natural Law?

He does this in three ways:

1. By a proof from natural reason. It is a violation of nature to deliberately deflect from its natural end an act which belongs to the rational order to which we are subject. Now the marital act belongs to that superior order to which we are all subject. And its natural purpose is procreation. Hence any artifice which deprives the conjugal act of this its destiny is necessarily and always a violation of nature.

2. By Holy Scripture. According to the interpretation which is accepted in the Church, God struck Onan dead because he was guilty of this sin.

3. He proves it from the teaching of the Church, where he states that an uninterrupted traditional Christian teaching reprobates these practices, and where he solemnly confirms this teaching of the ordinary magisterium of the Church.

90. Are We to Understand This Solemn Promulgation as an Infallible Definition?

Before formally answering so grave a question it seems proper to quote the words of the Sovereign Pontiff himself.

Since, therefore, openly departing from the uninterrupted Christian tradition, some recently have fudged it possible solemnly to declare another doctrine regarding this question, the Catholic Church, to whom God has entrusted the defense of the integrity and purity of morals, standing erect in the midst of the moral ruin which surrounds her, in order that she may preserve the chastity of the nuptial union from being defiled by this foul stain, raises her voice in token of Divine ambassadorship and through Our mouth proclaims anew: Any use whatsoever of matrimony exercised in such a way that the act is deliberately frustrated in its natural power to generate life is an offence against the law of God and of nature, and those who indulge in such are branded with the guilt of a grave sin.

Next, let us remember that the Pope, either alone or in union with the College of the Bishops, is the teaching Church, whose infallibility is guaranteed by Our Lord Jesus Christ.

The Church speaks through the Pope, not as through her messenger, but as through her head and teacher. This mission of teaching and of defending the integrity of morals to which the Holy Father appeals here, is in himself.

Infallible, in matters of faith and morals, is the traditional and constant doctrine of the Church treasured in the ordinary magisterium of the Bishops united to the See of Peter. Infallible is the solemn proclamation of a doctrine regarding faith or morals which the supreme Pastor, speaking as such to the universal Church, obliges it to hold.

To what conclusion do these considerations lead us?

We must conclude that the Holy Father, who, in this Encyclical, from the start, declares that he is addressing himself to the entire Church and even to the whole world:

(a) States that on this question of conjugal onanism, there exists a Christian doctrine which has been transmitted from the beginning and which has been always faithfully kept, and hence is already infallibly taught by the ordinary magisterium;

(b) Takes occasion from the departure from this doctrine on the part of some to promulgate it solemnly for all; and since he does this as teacher of the universal Church conscious of his mission to teach, and as a sign of his Divine mission, he thereby obliges all to hold this doctrine. It is, as he explicitly states, the Catholic Church which speaks by his mouth.

In the presence of such language on the part of the supreme Pastor, we cannot doubt that we are confronted with one of those cases, which ate not infrequent, where the Pope teaches infallibly a truth already defined and believed by the Church. This is the reason why the Sovereign Pontiff can also declare himself an infallible interpreter of the primitive Church.

91. What Points Are Infallibly Defined?

These three:

(a) Every use of marriage in the exercise of which the act is artificially deprived of its natural power of procreating life, is a violation of the law of God;

(b) It is a violation of the natural law;

(c) It is a grave sin.

92. What Corollary Flows From This?

That all preventive measures whose purpose is to make future marital intercourse sterile, whether temporarily or permanently, are also intrinsically wrong, and are also grievously sinful.

More than once before, the Holy See had expressed itself rather clearly on this subject. On 19 April 1853, the Supreme Congregation of the Holy Office, without going into details, declared that such an abuse of marriage is intrinsically evil. Then the Sacred Penitentiary, 13 November 1901, approved the action of a priest who refused to follow the direction of a confessor who was otherwise well-qualified and who had been professor of moral theology in a seminary, where the confessor had held that in order to avoid an excessive number of children or excessive fatigue on the part of the wife, a husband might vitiate the conjugal act, provided he had in view only the allaying of concupiscence. The Sacred Penitentiary declared that a penitent who refused to give up such a practice could not be absolved, as it amounted to onanism pure and simple.

93. What Are the Recent Authorities Which the Encyclical Reproaches with Having Solemnly Preached a Different Doctrine?

They are the prelates of the Anglican Church, who numbering 307 in congress at Lambeth Palace in London, by a majority of 193 to 67, declared, in nebulous terms it is true and not without some signs of shame, that in certain cases where procreation was forbidden, another voice than that of continence might be followed. The count indicates that many refused to vote.

Since in its report the Commission of the Conference acknowledged the tradition to which the Pope appeals, but observed that the tradition lacked the confirmation of a conciliar definition, we think it probable that the Holy Father intended by a solemn declaration to fill what might falsely be regarded as a lacuna.

94. Does the Holy Father Confine Himself to This Doctrinal Teaching?

Far from it. Coming to a very important practical conclusion, he immediately adds:

We admonish, therefore, priests who hear confessions, and others who have the care of souls, in virtue of Our supreme authority and in Our solicitude for the salvation of souls, not to allow the Faithful entrusted to them to err regarding this most grave law of God; much more, that they keep themselves immune from such false opinions, in no way conniving in them. If any confessor or pastor of souls, which may God forbid, lead the Faithful entrusted to him into these errors or should at least confirm them by approval or by guilty silence, let him be mindful of the fact that he must render a strict account to God, the Supreme Judge, for the betrayal of his sacred trust, and let him take to himself the words of Christ: "They are blind leaders of the of the blind lead the blind, both fall into the pit." (Matthew 15:14)

This grave warning is in itself an obligatory standard for those to whom it is addressed, that is, confessors and those who have care of souls. In fact, the Holy Father gives it in virtue of his supreme authority and as universal Pastor.

He, therefore, warns those who hear confessions and who have the care of souls:

(a) not to leave the Faithful who are entrusted to them in error regarding this grave law of God;

(b) to preserve themselves from false opinions in this matter;

(c) to connive in no way in false opinions on this subject.

Consequently, he threatens with a severe account to be rendered to God:

(a) those among them who should lead the Faithful into error;

(b) those who might confirm them in their error, either by formal approval or deliberate silence.

Former declarations of the Holy See define in a very useful way the attitudes on the part of confessors which are condemned in this passage of the Encyclical, and the duty of all confessors to avoid all connivance and even to undeceive penitents who have fallen into error on a point of such grave moral and social consequence.

A priest of the diocese of Angers, in a query to the Sacred Penitentiary, described three classes of confessors.

(1) Those of the first class, believing that ignorance even if it be vincible excuses from grave sin, and being persuaded that to call attention to the abuse of marriage would only increase the guilt of the parties and even perhaps keep them, away from the Sacraments, conclude that it is licit and even advisable to favor this error on the part of penitents, by not disturbing it, or even by adroitly insinuating it, provided that can be done without lying. Consequently, they not only ask no questions on the subject, but even when the question of the gravity of the guilt of onanism is put to them, they evade it by skillful parrying, or they ask the penitent what he himself thinks of it. And when the latter declares that in view of the rights of marriage or of some other consideration "he can't see so much harm in it," these confessors are "glad to leave him in this good faith.

(2) Others, although they hold the same views as those of the first class, still do not conceal the truth if they are asked about it; but when the penitent confines himself to simply confessing the sin of onanism, they take care not to lay any emphasis on this accusation, but, having heard the confession, they content themselves with arousing the penitent to contrition in a general way, and they absolve him on his affirmation that he detests all sin.

(3) A third class of confessors are of opinion that it is extremely rare that vincible ignorance can go so far as to render subjectively venial a sin which is objectively grave, and that such error can in any event not last very long-the character of the sin itself as being contrary to nature, the environment in which the question is constantly being discussed, prevent that. Hence, whether the avowal of this sin has been spontaneous, or whether it has been brought out by prudent questioning, these confessors chide the penitent who has been guilty of this sin, just as they would for any other grave sin, to the extent that has interest seems to require it, and they absolve him only when they have elicited from him sufficient signs of repentance and of a firm purpose of amendment for the future.

Following this exposition, three questions were submitted to the Sacred Penitentiary:

1. Is it allowed to favor the good faith spoken of in the first instance? Is it allowed to produce it?

2. Do the confessors of the second class fulfill the duties of their state?

3. Are the confessors of the third class open to the reproach of disturbing themselves and their penitents more than is reasonable; or is their practice rather to be regarded as absolutely right?

The Sacred Penitentiary answered the first two questions in the negative. To the third, it replied: "Assuming that, as regards the questions sometimes to be asked of married persons about their use of marriage, these confessors confine themselves within the limits indicated by the Roman Ritual and by approved authorities, their practice is beyond all reproach."

Ten years later, in 1886, a French Bishop addressed himself to the Sacred Penitentiary. After bewailing the spread of the evil which is now committed no longer for fear of having too many children, but for fear of having any, an evil which has depleted the country and the sanctuary, and has alarmed sociologists and moralists alike, the Bishop refers to the disagreement which exists among confessors on the need of questioning penitents, in modest and reserved language, upon this matter.

In support of the position of those confessors who think that they are not allowed to remain mute, he cites the words of Benedict XIV in his Bull "Apostolica Constitutio": "By such silence the penitent is either kept in ignorance of crimes which he ought to know about, or be is confirmed in the evil practice, not without scandal to others who think that anything is lawful for themselves when they see that it is practiced with impunity by persons who are frequenting the Sacraments."

Then, proceeding to his questions, the Bishop asks:

1. When a confessor has reason to suspect that the penitent, who says not a word of birth control, is addicted to this criminal practice, may the confessor omit to question him prudently and discreetly because he foresees that by doing so he will disturb the good faith of some persons and cause many to avoid the Sacraments? Is not the confessor rather bound to question the penitent in a prudent and discreet manner?

2. When a confessor knows, either from spontaneous confession or as a result of prudent questioning, that the penitent is given to birth control, is be bound to warn him of the gravity of this sin as of other mortal sms, and (as the Roman Ritual puts it) to chide him with paternal charity, and to give him absolution only when from sufficient indications he shall judge that he repents of the past and has the purpose of never practicing onanism any more?

In view of the fact," thus spoke the Sacred Penitentiary, "that the abominable vice of which there is question in the case proposed, has become widespread, the Sacred Penitentiary has deemed it its duty to reply to the questions asked as follows: To the first question: usually, in the negative to the first part, in the affirmative to the second. To the second question: in the affirmative, according to the teaching of approved authorities."

These replies tell us dearly enough that questions should not be asked without reason, but only when there is ground for suspicion that the crime is being dissimulated or concealed; that the fear of disturbing good faith or of driving away from the Sacraments should not regularly stop a confessor from questioning; that when a penitent is known to be guilty, he must be informed of the gravity of the sin.

Certainly, as a professor of theology remarked not long ago, we cannot, by lightly giving absolutions, put the sacramental seal upon immorality.

It goes without saying that the questioning must always be done in correct language, rather reserved, but dear and leaving no room for misunderstanding or evasion.

95. Does the Holy Father Never Allow That Married People be Left in Good Faith Regarding Their Marital Relations?

The Holy Father makes no pronouncement for particular exceptional cases. The general practice must be to undeceive the Faithful when they are in error on this matter; and one may never positively confirm them in error, even by silence which would be interpreted as approval.

But, in the absence of scandal and of any positive confirmation, a genuine good faith, may, in our opinion, be left to spouses who are embarrassed by a humanly inextricable situation. See, for example, the excellent Instructio pro conjessariis de usu et abusu matrimonii, written at Eichstatt Seminary, 1931.

96. Why Do You Say "A Genuine Good Faith"?

Because there are cases of so-called good faith which are such only in appearance. For example a Catholic who, though he knew the teaching of the Encyclical, preferred to follow his own judgment on the plea that the severity of that teaching was extreme, could not be considered to be in good faith.

97. Does Not the Encyclical in Fact Show an Excess of Severity?

On the contrary it evidences a just moderation.

(a) It excuses the party who suffers rather than commits sin, when for a perfectly weighty reason he tolerates on the part of his partner a perversion of the right order, which he himself does not intend, and fulfils his duty of charity by striving to induce the other party to return to right conduct.

(b) It mentions the other secondary ends of the conjugal union: mutual affection to be fostered, the allaying of concupiscence; two ends which render the use of marriage lawful under circumstances in which, considering either the persons or the time, sterility seems either certain or very probable, provided always that the act takes place in the regular way.

98. May Married People by Mutual Agreement Live in Continence?

Among well-intentioned Anglicans there are several authorities who are of opinion that the vocation to the married life imposes on the parties the duty to give children to their country and to the Church, if they can.

This is, however, a false position. The possession of a right may be conceived without the obligation to use it. No doubt, in the institution of marriage, God wished to provide for the propagation of the human race. But this end is sufficiently attained without every couple being obliged to have children.

99. How Are We to Understand That Material-Cooperation Which Is Permitted to One of the Parties When the Other Is Determined to Do Wrong?

As the Holy Father has no intention of coming down to details of practical morality, we must evidently have recourse to approved authorities and to former declarations of the Holy See. According to this teaching, there is question of cooperation in an act which was begun in the right way, and which the other party alone interrupts in such a way as to violate nature.

We are therefore, for our part, unable to agree with the passage in which Reverend John Ryan of Washington, in his notes on the moral teaching of the Encyclical, insinuates that the Encyclical may extend the field of permissible material cooperation in the face of the common opinion now existing on the subject. The distinctions which the moralists make are founded on a certain principle and are confirmed by the replies of the Sacred Penitentiary of 3 April and 3 June 1916.

100. May the Parties Confine Their Use of Marriage to Those Times That Are Called Periods of Sterility?

The Encyclical says: Nor are those considered as acting against nature who in the married state use their right in the proper manner although on account of natural reasons either of time or of certain defects, new life cannot be brought forth.

As long as the act takes place normally it remains objectively directed toward its primary end, which is generation; and since, according to the maxim that the purpose of the law is not within the matter of the law (finis legis non cadit sub legem), there is no obligation, while observing the law, to intend the end, for which it was promulgated, it follows that the act is not necessarily vitiated by deliberately choosing a certain time with the intention of avoiding conception. Of course, the couple are bound to welcome any children that might come, if, as sometimes happens, their plan fails. The conjugal intercourse in any event serves the other ends of marriage. Besides, let us observe that there is this great difference between the practice of birth control and the restricted use of marriage of which we speak: the abuses of birth control can be practiced constantly, they give free rein to passion, they do not demand the exercise of any moral force whatever; whereas this limited use of marriage requires, for the voluntary abstinence on certain days, a moral force the exercise of which is not without its social value.

In itself indifferent or objectively good, this limitation which is not a violation of nature, may, according to the circumstances and the intention, be praiseworthy, less desirable, or even worthy of blame.

Accordingly the Sacred Penitentiary, in its reply of 16 June 1880, declared that there was no reason to disturb those married people who in their use of marriage restricted themselves to days that are physiologically sterile, and that this practice might be insinuated caute, that is with prudent discretion. With prudent discretion we say; the uncertainty of the result is enough to suggest prudence; besides the confessor should not be a counselor of infecundity. The insinuation of this course of action may be appropriate as a means of preventing formal sins, or as offering a way out of a critical situation where the danger of incontinence makes intercourse imperative, and yet where conception would be perilous for the mother. It goes without saying that this practice normally supposes the agreement of both parties.

101. In View of the Other Ends of Marriage, Why Is It Always Absolutely Necessary That the Natural Order be Preserved in Conjugal Relations?

Because these other ends, subordinated as they are to the principal end, cannot be in opposition to it. Besides, the other ends themselves would be frustrated by wrong relations. Such relations cannot foster true love, which supposes mutual respect; too often they result only in disagreement and separation. Neither does the seeking of satisfaction at all costs allay concupiscence. "It is like a drink which increases thirst."

102. What Does the Encyclical Say of the Excuses That Are Alleged as Grounds for Obtaining Greater Indulgence?

Some, of which any decent person should be ashamed, the Encyclical disdains to mention; but it could not be indifferent in the presence of the extremely difficult situation in which a poor mother may find herself. Here, it begins by toning down the alarms with the remark, so often confirmed by experience, that the reasons for alarm are often exaggerated; then, showing an affectionate compassion and at the same time giving encouragement to the mother who is face to face with death through heroic devotion to duty, it expresses admiration for her and assures her of a magnificent reward from God.

103. What Does the Encyclical Say About Material Difficulties Which Seem to Stand in the Way of the Birth of Additional Children?

On this subject also the Holy Father shows a deep feeling of compassion for the parents. However, he immediately lifts up their hearts to the high reality of God's law. However [he adds] these parents should take care lest the calamitous state of their external affairs should be the occasion for a much more calamitous error. No difficulty can arise that justifies the putting aside of the law of God which forbids all acts intrinsically evil. There is no possible circumstance in which husband and wife cannot, strengthened by the grace of God, fulfill faithfully their duties and preserve in wedlock their chastity unspotted.

104. What Other Opinions and Practices Does the Encyclical Denounce as Criminal Attacks Upon the Child?

The Encyclical treats as a crime all attempts upon the life of the child in the womb of his mother.

105. What Are We to Understand by the Term "Child"?

It means not only a child whose body is already formed, but also a child in the fetal or embryonic stage, in other words every fertilized ovum. In fact canon 747 of the Code of Canon Law in prescribing the baptism of every fetus, however small, enjoins that every fetus be treated as a human being.

106. What Are We to Understand by an Attempt Upon His Life?

It includes in the first place feticide, that is, the cruel operation which crushes the skull of the fetus or cuts his little body to pieces according to the need for saving the mother. Besides, it includes every direct abortion.

Not only the majority of the more modern moral theologians, but the Holy Office itself consider direct abortion as similar to feticide. For abortion is not merely the placing of a child outside the surroundings which are indispensable for him to live, but it is the violent tearing away of the membranes and tissues by which the child is as it were one with his mother, and through which he breathes and receives nourishment-membranes which, at least in part, belong to him as an organ developed by his own growth. Abortion directly produced is a deadly wound inflicted on an innocent human being.

107. What Are Some of the Opinions That Are Current on the Subject of Feticide and Abortion?

Catholic teaching is today unanimous in condemning all feticide and all abortion directly produced upon a fetus, unless it be morally certain that he is already dead.

Outside of this Catholic tradition, some, holding that the unborn child has no rights, allow the father or mother to decide his fate; others allow feticide only in cases of imminent danger, where it is the only way to save the mother's life, or they allow abortion only for very grave medical, social, or eugenic reasons.

Such a determining reason of a medical nature would be to kill the child in order to solve the conflict which has arisen between the life or health of the mother and the existence of the child. Social reasons are to save the honor and reputation of the mother, or to leave her free to carry on her occupations and gain her livelihood. A eugenic reason is to prevent the birth of children who would be monstrous or idiotic. The idea of the required gravity of the motive is evidently more or less broad, according to the religion or "philosophical convictions" of the doctor or adviser.

All of them, however, as the Encyclical goes on to state, demand that the indication which in one form or another they defend, be recognized as such by the public law and in no way penalized. In other words, they insist that the law should conform itself to their theories and distinguish on the one hand between criminal feticide or abortion, punishable by legal penalties, and on the other, therapeutic or medical feticide or abortion, which should be legally authorized. In fact, already a doctor is in no danger of prosecution as long as he is supposed to have acted according to the dictates of science. Worse still, it sometimes happens that a doctor is forbidden to practice laparotomy (cesarian section) in rural districts, although this operation might save both mother and child, while at the same time he is liable to prosecution for malpractice if he allows the mother to die under circumstances where he might have saved her by directly killing the child.

108. What Does the Sovereign Pontiff Say in Opposition to These Theories or Systems?

He opposes to them in the first place the peremptory argument embodied in the Divine commandment, "Thou shalt not kill"; and he rejects in passing the futile exceptions which have had a certain vogue. He declares that the right to take away life cannot be appealed to, since even public authority has no such power in the case of an innocent person; nor can the right of self-defense, since there is no question of an aggressor, even materially unjust, and the development of the child, even though it should become a fatal danger to the mother, does not violate objectively any of her rights, nor contain any injustice; nor the right of extreme necessity, since that never goes to the extent of killing a living person. The life of each of the two individuals is equally inviolable. Such a thing as a conflict in which one light might be regarded as of less value than the other, is an impossibility.

We must, therefore, conclude with the Encyclical that physicians are bound to try to save both lives, both having an equal value in the eyes of God, the mother's and the child's. The physician has no right to set himself up as judge to pronounce a sentence of death. No diploma confers such power, which would exceed that of the most absolute monarch.

109. However, in Those Rare and Extreme Cases Where, Unless the Fetus Is Removed, the Death of the Child and of the Mother Is Certain, Does Not Common Sense Tell Us That it Is Better to Sacrifice One Life Than Two?

When the doctor abstains from interfering, he himself sacrifices no one; whereas if he does interfere by abortion or feticide, he protects the life of the mother at the cost of committing a homicide. Here is a mere comparison, which we do not offer as an argument: suppose two men, for want of provisions, are about to die of hunger; is it permissible for the stronger of the two to kill the weaker, in order to take his share of the provisions? That is the act of the physician who kills the weaker, the child, to save the stronger, the mother. If the parity is denied on the ground that in the supposed case the weaker person is not causing to the stronger any direct harm, whereas it sometimes happens that the fetal placenta poisons the mother, we answer in the first place that some good gynecologists have told us that the theory of placental poisoning is being more and more questioned. But suppose even that it is true, and return to our comparison. If the weaker person, forcibly held close to the other, involuntarily exhales a harmful vapor, is his right to life thereby impaired? May the stronger in that case resort to murder to free himself from this unhealthy environment?

Besides, is it quite certain that unless an abortion is performed the mother and the child will die? Is it very far from certain. There are not wanting cases in which a conscientious physician has saved both mother and child in spite of the medical indication of abortion. The doctor's verdict is based on probabilities.

110. After All, Is it Not a Pitt That Human Lives Should Be Lost Because of a Principle?

It is not, when that principle is a saving one, which preserves greater values than those it sacrifices. Now faith in Providence assures us that every principle imposed by the law of God is a conserving force of higher values.

In the present instance, one sees, it is true, some very sad, pitiable cases, in which a person dies, who might have been saved by abortion. But does not a more far-sighted vision see also a greater number of lives saved by the rigor of the principle?

This severity intensifies the effort to save both lives; and this effort is sometimes rewarded with complete success. At the same time the spirit of invention is stimulated, and this results in discoveries which render out of date even the medical indication for abortion or feticide. "Respect for the life of the child," writes Dr. Clement, "stimulates progress." Is it not through this means that specialists now declare themselves able to control cases which were formerly despaired of, cases of so-called uncontrollable vomiting?

Let us in addition observe this psychological fact. When a physician who practices medical abortion is attending a woman who is pregnant and ill, everything conspires against the child. What reproaches are in store for the doctor if the mother dies when he had reason to believe he could save both her and the child! But the child, needlessly sacrificed, will make no complaint from beyond the gravel If one could get the statistics, we are persuaded that the number of real victims of medical abortion would be far greater than that of so-called victims who are supposed to have died for having been unwilling to consent to abortion.

111. Why Does the Holy Father Speak, of "Direct" Killing?

Because the death of the child may be a consequence, not willed, although foreseen and inevitable, of a medical treatment which is permitted in spite of this foreseen consequence.

Although we may never do what is evil, still we have neither the obligation nor the power to prevent all evil from happening. We cannot be responsible for an evil consequence flowing from our good actions, -when that consequence does not depend on us, and when the motive for acting is in proportion to the evil which is feared. In such cases the evil cannot be imputed to us as willed, because we do not will it; nor as permitted, because by our scrutiny of the reasons for acting, and by the precautions we have taken, we have fully satisfied our positive duty of removing, as far as is humanly possible, the accidental evil consequences of our action.

112. But What Is Necessary in Order That an Abortion May be Classified as Indirect?

It is necessary that the abortion be not willed either as an end or as a means, but simply be permitted as occurring in spite of all, through the intervention of a factor which we cannot remove. It is, therefore, not sufficient that in an abortion the only purpose intended be to save the mother, if the abortion is a means to that end, if the expulsion of the fetus is utilized as a means.

In such a case, since the abortion is chosen, it is willed, and is, therefore, direct. Consequently, abortion will be indirect only in case the morbid condition of the maternal matrix requires the immediate removal of that organ, even though this removal necessarily entails the exit of the fetus which is enclosed in the uterus. The abortion, however, would be direct if the womb were to be emptied in order by that means to stop a hemorrhage. It is absolutely direct when it is practised because the mother is affected with tuberculosis or general weakness, or because it is feared that the child will be physically deformed or mentally affected.

113. The Encyclical Mentions a Country Where Abortions Are Very Frequently Practiced with the Sanction of Public Authority. Can You Name a Country of Which This Is True?

It is notorious that in Soviet Russia, notably in Moscow, there is an official Institute where abortion is practiced upon any woman who asks for it. About 30,000 abortions a year are performed there. But statistics supply us with precious information on the physical harm caused by these operations. Nature takes her revenge upon these unnatural mothers.

114. Is Eugenic Science Then to be Reprobated?

On the contrary, efforts and researches which tend to improve the health and vigor of the human race in themselves praiseworthy. The Holy Father teaches that we may, and should, take account of the findings and recommendations of this science or art. But the end does not justify the means. One cannot give to eugenics such primacy as to forget the law of God in order to satisfy its demands. On 21 March 1931, the Holy Office, with the approval of the Holy Father, declared that we must absolutely reject and hold as false and condemned by the Encyclical "Casti Connubii" of 31 December 1930, the so-called "eugenic" doctrine, as well "positive" eugenics as "negative," together with the means which it indicates for the improvement of the human race, by neglecting the laws of nature, of God, or of the Church, concerning marriage and the rights of individuals.

The Holy Father takes occasion in this connection to remind public authorities that it is their duty to protect the lives of the innocent, especially of those who cannot defend themselves. To deliver them to death, even at the hands of physicians, is to commit a crime that cries to heaven for vengeance.

115. Is It Never Allowed for a Good End to Remove a Child From the Womb Before it Has Attained Maturity?

We must distinguish between abortion (the moralists call it abortion when a child who is not viable is removed) and premature delivery. The latter will be allowed when it is practised at such a time and by such means that under ordinary conditions the lives of both the mother and the child will be provided for.

116. What Are the Conditions Under Which This May be Done?

In the first place, the child must be already viable. At present, thanks to artificial incubators the child may be said to be viable after about six months of life within the womb. But this initial viability is a very different thing from full viability which requires at least eight months. Between these two periods viability goes through varying degrees, in which the chances of life are unequal. Moreover, premature delivery is more or less harmful to the child, according to his degree of maturity. Mere viability may not, therefore, always be a sufficient reason for delivering a child of six months. If there is imminent danger, the operation will be legitimate as soon as the child has a chance to survive. If such a danger is not certain, then its probabilities must be considered, as well as the harm that would result from prolonging the pregnancy; and in the absence of a controlling reason of this nature, one should wait the full eight months. In short, the formula of the Holy Office gives us this rule: Consider the two lives, that of the mother and that of the child, as of equal value; and do what is for the best interests of both, everything considered, and without forgetting that the saving of the mother's life is a very great benefit to the child himself.

117. What Other Claim of Eugenics Is Equally Rejected by the Holy Father?

The Holy Father in no wise admits that the State may for eugenic reasons directly forbid marriage to persons who are naturally capable of fulfilling its functions; and still less does he admit the right of the State to so mutilate a person as to deprive him of a natural faculty.

In our day those who cultivate the science of eugenics will willingly grant that their studies are not sufficiently advanced, nor their conclusions sufficiently certain to enable even themselves, just yet, to advocate such radical measures.

But these arguments lead only to a tentative answer. Accordingly the Holy Father passes over these considerations, and, by a peremptory and definite answer, confronts the "eugenists" with the principle of the incompetence of the civil authority.

118. How Can This Incompetence be Shown?

It can be shown first from a true concept of human society. The mission of society is by no means to deprive man of rights which he had before, but rather to facilitate and protect the normal exercise of these rights. As long as there is no question of persons guilty of crime, the State cannot, even for the common good, restrict rights, other than those which come from itself, such as political rights.

It can also be shown from the dignity of a human person. Man, with his body and its members, does not belong to himself; he belongs to God and to His Christ. God gives him only the use thereof. The consent of the individual could not therefore avail to transfer to others a right which he never had himself.

119. Does the Encyclical Permit Mutilation as a Punishment for Certain Crimes, or as a Preventive Measure Against the Repetition of Crimes?

The Encyclical does not pronounce on these questions. It does not intend either to approve or to condemn such measures.

Our own humble opinion would be for the negative, at least at the present time, for the reason that this type of punishment is repugnant to our penal system which does not favor corporal punishments directly and positively applied, such as whipping.

120. Must We Then Approve the Marriages of Blighted Individuals, Whose Progeny Can be None Other Than Wretched?

According to the Encyclical "Casti Connubii" such persons should often be advised not to marry; but if they are otherwise capable of marrying, they cannot be charged with grave sin in neglecting the advice.

121. Why Should They Often be Advised Not to Marry?

Because the prevision of defective children diminishes for the parties themselves the hope of a happy union, and suggests temptations against right conduct in married life. Neither is it right to aggravate without necessity the burdens that weigh down public administration or private charity.

122. Why Should Not Such Unions Always be Discouraged?

Because there may be grave reasons, either of a private nature, such as the moral weakness of the parties, or of a public nature, such as for example the need of an heir for a throne or for an illustrious family, which outweigh the undesirable consequences of such unions. Let us not forget the words of the Apostle: It is better to marry than to burn with the flame of unrestrained passion.

Neither must we forget that those whom nature has, so to speak, disinherited have still the sublime last end of human individuals, and can still attain eternal blessedness. Indirectly, they even render a service to society by detaching the affections of men from this earth where so many have to suffer; and also, by fostering feelings of sympathy, which is a sentiment of so social a nature that an unbelieving philosopher ranked it above all others; by bringing into play the noble virtue of charity; and by delivering men from that selfishness which seeks enjoyment for its own sake. How dull, sad, and cold life would be in a society where there were no unfortunates to help, no afflicted ones to console.

123. How Is it That a Person Who Contracts a Marriage Which, From a Eugenic Standpoint Is Inadvisable, Does Not Commit a Grave Sin?

Because the power of procreation gives him the right to contract marriage. The exercise of a right does not involve in itself any contradiction of the essential order, and cannot therefore, as such, be stigmatized as a grave sin.

124. In Denting the Existence of Mortal Sin in Such a Case, Does the Encyclical Recognize That it Is a Venial Sin?

The text of the Encyclical does not exclude venial sin, but neither does it affirm that one is committed in every case. It simply abstracts from the question of venial sin.

125. If There Is a Venial Sin, What Is the Reason for It?

The fact that in the use of the right, though there is no violation of the essential order, there is nevertheless a yielding to a disordered inclination. Such would be the case for instance if a person physically unfit should insist on marrying, although a life of continence were not beyond his power. The venial sin, therefore," is found in the inopportune use of a right, just as, in the state of marriage, such a sin is committed when the parties use their right in a somewhat irregular fashion.

126. Admitting That the State Has no Right to Forbid Marriage Permanently, Can it Forbid it Temporarily to Persons Who, for a Certain Period, Would be Sources of Infection to the Persons They Might Marry?

The State could exercise such power, at least by putting itself in agreement with the competent authority, which, in the case of baptized persons, is the Church.

127. In Vindicating fob All Persons the Inviolable Right to Marry, Does Not the Encyclical Favor the Gradual Deterioration of the Human Race?

That is the claim made by some eugenists; but the better informed contest the value of their arguments. It seems rather that nature herself tends to eliminate the unfit.

128 In Denying to the Civil Authority All Direct Power Over the Bodies of the Citizen and Over His Natural Faculties, What Indirect Power of the Same Civil Authority Is Implicitly Recognized?

The power of condemning guilty persons to seclusion in virtue of vindicative justice, and the power to protect society against dangerous, persons by imprisoning them, and by segregating those whose contact would spread disease.

129. How Does Eugenics Attack, the Child Whilst it Pretends to Secure Better Births?

It attacks, not the children whom it permits to be born and to live, but those whom it prevents from being born. These suffer an irreparable personal wrong, because the others can never take their place.

At the same time, more directly, it attacks marriage in the natural right man has to marry. For two reasons, therefore, the Encyclical had to condemn its exaggerations.

THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST CONJUGAL FIDELITY

130. What Attacks Are Made Upon Conjugal Fidelity?

After calling attention to the fact that every attack upon the child is equally an attack upon conjugal fidelity, because such a sin always compromises the primary end of marriage, the Encyclical mentions three special assaults which are launched respectively against conjugal chastity, against the hierarchy of the family, and against the love which should be the ruling power in the home.

131. How Is Conjugal Chastity Threatened?

It is impaired by those friendly unions or "companionate marriages" which we have already characterized above (number 86); also by that worldly point of view which, because of the exuberance of certain appetites, regards the uprightness of virtuous married people as out of date, demands greater license in relations with third parties, and the abolition of the legal barriers that still exist against adultery.

132. What Does the Holy Father Say in Opposition to These Aberrations?

He appeals to the hearts of chaste couples; he invokes the immutable Divine prohibition: "Thou shalt not commit adultery," and the unalterable declaration of Christ: "Whosoever shall look on a woman to lust after her, hath already committed adultery with her in his heart." (Matthew 5:28)

133. What Error Is Opposed to the Hierarchy of the Family?

The theory which holds that the married woman should be freed from all subordination, and put on a footing of perfect equality with her husband. There is a propaganda for a physiological emancipation which would withdraw the wife from the duties of a spouse and mother; an economic emancipation, which would assure her full liberty of movement enabling her to administer her property and her affairs as she pleases; and a social emancipation, which would free her from domestic duties and enable her to throw herself according to her natural bent into politics or business.

134. How Is This Error Refuted in the Encyclical?

This total emancipation is rejected as an upsetting of the entire domestic order, and a cheapening of woman herself, who, robbed of her glory of spouse and mother, would become once more what she was in the pagan world, a mere instrument of the passions of her husband. This so-called "emancipated" woman, now neither a virgin nor a mother, on whom the modern world thinks it is conferring freedom by enabling her to "live no longer for others but for herself, that is for her pleasure and according to her whims," under the influence of concupiscences, the only rights now recognized, undergoes "the brutal domination of him who has received from nature the gift of strength, over her whose weakness will henceforth be defenseless, since she will no longer have the protection of the Christian laws of marriage."

For that matter, what serious historian does not acknowledge that woman owes her dignity and her true liberty to the Gospel of Christ?

Absolute equality is rejected because the interests of the family, the duties of married life, the unity and stability of the institution of marriage demand a certain inequality of rank. But the Sovereign Pontiff has made the necessary or fitting reservations beforehand especially where he recognizes the equal right of both parties to the marriage, to demand of the other the acts that are proper to married life. (See number 55, above.)

135. Must This Inequality Always Remain the Same?

Not at all; it can and should adapt itself to varying circumstances. Thus no one objects to the abolition of certain legal disabilities of women regarding contracts. But these variations can never change essentially the order established by God.

136. In Condemning the Social Emancipation of Woman, Does the Encyclical Disapprove of the Political Rights Which Woman Has Won in Various Countries, the Right of Suffrage, and of Holding Public Office?

The Encyclical does not touch upon these points in any way. It disapproves only such an injection of woman into public life as would imply her desertion of the home.

137. What Attack Is Made Upon Conjugal Love?

For the love which is engrafted upon a sacred duty and which persists through trials and difficulties, there is an attempt to substitute an insecure and capricious affection and to make the constancy or inconstancy of that sentiment the norm which shall determine the continuance or breaking off of the marital union itself.

138. What Does the Holy Father Say About This?

He calls it an attempt to substitute a house built upon sand for one that is built on a rock.

139. But After All Evert Chain Is a Burden. Does Not This Chain of Duties Interfere With the Drive, the Spontaneity of the Feelings?

We must take account of the actual condition of the human race since the Fall of our First Parents: It is, as a matter of fact, impossible to count on any perseverance which is not safeguarded by an obligation. The experience of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries proves conclusively that liberty alone does not lead to welfare and happiness.

THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE SACRAMENT

140. In What Direction Is the Principal Effort of the Enemies of Christian Marriage Put Forth?

According to the Encyclical the principal attack is against marriage as a Sacrament. The Holy Father says: And now considering that the third blessing, which is that of the Sacrament, far surpasses the other two, we should not be surprised to find that this, because of its outstanding excellence, is much more sharply attacked by the same people.

141. Bt What Tactics?

By tactics in which we can distinguish three steps: the denial of the sacred character of marriage; the assault upon its indissolubility; and the relegation of marriage to the rank of profane and civil affairs.

142. How Is the Denial of the Sacred Character of Marriage Formulated?

By regarding the marriage which is called civil as the real marriage, which can later be supplemented by a religious ceremony, a nuptial blessing, which is in no way essential.

143. Is it Impossible for the Civil Ceremony to be the True Nuptial Contract?

It is impossible in this sense, that the declaration of a civil magistrate can never form the bond, whose only efficient cause is the exchange of consent by the two parties themselves. For non-baptized persons the civil contract may be the real contract in this sense that the competent authority - and according to a common opinion, that is, for those cases, the civil authority - can require on pain of nullity that the exchange of consent be given in the presence of a civil magistrate and two witnesses; just as the Church, since the Council of Trent, and now under the Code of Canon Law, requires on pain of nullity for marriages between two Catholics and between a Catholic and a non-Catholic, that the exchange of consent be given regularly in the presence of an authorized priest and two witnesses.

We say this is required regularly, because the Code provides for certain cases in which the marriage may be validly contracted before any two witnesses, without the presence of a priest.

144. Is it Not the Nuptial Blessing Which Is the Sacred Element in a Marriage?

Although the nuptial blessing is a sacred ceremony, which, through the prayer of the Church, is a means of actual graces, yet it does not constitute the sacred element which is essential to marriage.

145. Where Is That Element?

It is in the mutual consent of the parties to the marriage.

146. Is the Sacred Character Peculiar to Christian Marriage?

A marriage between Christians is the only marriage which is a Sacrament; but in a lower degree every marriage contains something sacred, "put there," says Leo XIII, "by nature herself."

147. How Do You Prove That This Sacred Element Exists in Every Marriage?

We prove it from the unanimous consent of the peoples who have introduced a religious rite into the conjugal union; from the Divine origin of the institution of marriage; from the end of marriage, which is to bring up for God the children that may be born, and to lead the spouses themselves to God by the mutual help which they give each other; finally from the mysterious alliance between God and the spouses in human generation, God creating and infusing the spiritual soul into the body prepared by the parents. Leo XIII adds this more profound supernatural reason: "because marriage was from the beginning like an image of the Incarnation of the Word of God" (Encyclical "Arcanum").

The sacramental character gives besides to Christian marriage a new dignity or nobility in which the Apostle Saint Paul recognizes a great mystery in Christ and in the Church. (Ephesians 5:32)

The conjugal community cannot derive entirely from the created natural order, either its end or its means. Its principal end, the generation of children, cannot be attained unless God, the Creator of the spirit, intervene in the paternal function and complete it by the creation of the soul. By that very fact, marriage, even in its natural reality, overflows the confines of this world and surpasses the forces of this world. From this point of view alone, every marriage is a mystery. Then, consider its interior structure. We find there a sensible, corporal side, and a moral, spiritual side. Inasmuch as it is placed in the sphere of the senses, marriage is in danger of losing itself by sinking into animality. It must cry for help from above to escape from the preponderance of the corporal element. On its moral and spiritual side, it is more than a simple alliance of mind and heart; it implies the mutual self-surrender of two persons destined to be welded together in one flesh, a thing which is done in all security and purity only with the Divine good pleasure. Hence, even a purely natural marriage possesses a mystic character, and is a sacred and holy thing. According to the admirable expression of Leo XIII it is a foreshadowing of the Incarnation of the Son of God. Nowhere is man less autonomous than in marriage. Autonomy, by cutting the secret roots of its life, its special relation to God, makes marriage unrecognizable, reduces it to nothing.

What shall we say now of the supernatural elevation of Christian marriage by the sacramental character with which Christ has endowed the consent which gives it birth? What shall we say of the mission which belongs as a consequence to Christian spouses to represent by their union and love the union of Christ and His Church?

Listen to this exhortation which the Ritual used in Germany addresses to the bride and groom in the ceremony of marriage:

Just as Christ never abandons His Church, so you must never forsake each other, but ever remain faithfully united until death. And just as Christ sanctifies His Church, so too each of you should work for the sanctification of the other. As Christ loves His Church, and protects and cares for her, so the husband should love his wife, and protect her, and care for her with fidelity even unto the sacrifice of self; and as the Church is subject to Christ as to her head, so too the wife should obey her husband in all that is necessary, right, and fitting. And both should, in faithful unity, raise their children for Christ and for His holy Church.

Consequently, as Dr. Riedel observes, the Sacrament of matrimony confers on the partners a grace which perfects their natural love, a grace which cements their indissoluble unity, which helps them to sanctify each other, and enables them to fulfill their duty in regard to their children.

148. Why Do You Aschibe the Sacramental Character to "Marriage Between Christians" and not Only to Marriage Between Catholics?

Because marriage between Christians whom heresy or schism has separated from the true and only Catholic Church, is a Sacrament just as much as that between Catholics, provided the parties have been validly baptized.

149. What Duties, Therefore, Attach to Future Spouses Who Are Baptized?

A high regard for Christian marriage which they are about to contract, and an ardent zeal to make their union resemble as closely as possible its arch-type, the union between Christ and the Church.

150. Are All Baptized Persons Who Are Married Aware of the Sacramental Dignity of Their Union?

Unfortunately they are not, because Protestants deny the sacramental character of marriage.

Four centuries of Protestant teaching have established two convictions in the consciousness of the English-speaking world. The first is that the marriage of Christians is in no sense a sacramental union, and the second, that marriage is not a lasting, but a terminable, union. ... It is a contract which can be terminated at will by the parties concerned, provided that they fulfil the condition? prescribed by the State.

151. What Then Are We to Think of Mixed Marriages?

The Holy Father is very far from granting that other assumption of the profaners of marriage, namely that Catholics may marry persons of any other religion, or of no religion at all, or even professed atheists, without concerning themselves in the least about the religion of their chosen partner, and without any regard to ecclesiastical authority. On the contrary, the Sovereign Pontiff emphasizes 88 the just aversion which the Church professes for mixed marriages, and recalls to mind the words of the Code (Canon 1060): "Everywhere and with the greatest strictness the Church forbids marriages between baptized persons, one of whom is a Catholic and the other a member of a schismatical or heretical sect."

152. What Are the Disadvantages and Dangers of Mixed Marriages?

For the parties themselves, a less complete accord of thought, sentiment, and action, flowing from the fundamental disagreement on the question of religion.

Also, the greater difficulty of fulfilling the task of mutual sanctification; less assurance of peace and cordial understanding; and a fatal tendency toward religious indifference.

For the chldren, there is reason to fear apostasy, or religious indifference, which is next door to loss of faith and ungodliness.

153. Does not the Church Grant Dispensations from the Impediment of "Mixed Religion"?

Yes, she sometimes does, for grave reasons based on religious interests; for example, when in an exceptional case a well-grounded hope of the other party's early conversion makes the disadvantages and dangers more remote; and when a reason of a political nature demands such a concession. Sometimes, too, the reason for the dispensation is hardness of heart; it is given to prevent a still greater evil.

But when she does dispense, the Church imposes conditions dictated by the spiritual interests of the parties and of the children. She requires that the Catholic party work for the conversion of the other; that the non-Catholic party agree in writing to allow the Catholic party full liberty to practice his or her religion devoutly. Moreover both parties must promise in writing to educate in the Catholic Faith all the children that may be born of the marriage.

154. Is the Prohibition Against Mixed Marriages Merely of Ecclesiastical Origin?

It is a matter of natural and Divine law if there is danger of perversion for the Catholic spouse or for the children. (Canon 1060)

155. Why Is it That the Code of Canon Law Seems to Reserve its Severity for the Marriages of Catholics with Christians of Other Communions, and Wht Is it Not More Severe on Marriages with Unbaptized Persons?

It is in fact more severe on marriages with unbaptized persons, because for these it promulgates a more severe sanction: such marriages are null and void if contracted without a dispensation.

156. What Other Social Plague Flows from the Profanation of Marriage?

The plague of divorce, the increasing facility of which is deplored by the Encyclical. Even persons who are little affected by the religious motive are alarmed by the moral and social decline which statistics indicate. Nevertheless the obstinate abettors of the new paganism continue to agitate for the establishment of divorce where it does not yet exist, and for extending its facility where it is already recognized.

157. What Reasons Do They Allege for Such Action?

They allege both subjective and objective reasons: the interests of the parties themselves, they argue, demand that the innocent party be allowed to break with the guilty, and that the guilty party be withdrawn from a union which has become painful and strained; the welfare of the children requires that the quarrels and misbehavior of the parents be removed as a source of offence and scandal; the good of society demands the annulment of marriages which do not fulfill their purpose, and the legal separation of unhappy couples to prevent crimes, and to forestall lies and official perjuries committed in the course of legal proceedings for divorce.

Others, seeing no longer in marriage anything but a private contract, claim that, like any other contract, it can be made and dissolved by mutual consent.

158. What Does the Encyclical Say to These Objections?

It replies in the first place by recalling the inviolable law of God and of Christ, and the anathemas of the Council of Trent. We must have confidence in God and in the Church; neither God nor the Church is mistaken: that is enough to reject, in the name of the common welfare, the reasons conjured up under color of the same interest.

Then it adds that in extreme cases separation duly regulated by competent authority, that is, fundamentally by ecclesiastical authority, and as regards civil effects by the civil authority, is a sufficient protection against the evils mentioned.

Finally, a detailed contrast drawn between the regime of indissolubility and that allowing divorce, is an eloquent refutation of the argument attempted in favor of the latter.

159. From What Source Does the Encyclical Draw This Contrast?

From the earlier Encyclical of Leo XIII. "To revert again [says the Holy Father] to the expressions of Our predecessor, it is hardly necessary to point out what an amount of good is involved in the absolute indissolubility of wedlock and what a train of evils follows upon divorce Whenever the marriage bond remains intact, then we find marriages contracted with a sense of safety and security, while, when separations are considered and the dangers of divorce are present, the marriage contract itself becomes insecure, or at least gives ground for anxiety and surprises. On the one hand we see a wonderful strengthening of good will and co-operation in the daily life of husband and wife, while on the other both of these are miserably weakened by the presence of a facility for divorce. Here we have at a very opportune moment a source of help by which both parties are enabled to preserve their purity and loyalty; there we find harmful inducement to unfaithfulness. On this side we find the birth of children and their tuition and upbringing effectively promoted, many avenues of discord closed amongst families and relations, and the beginnings of rivalry and jealousy easily suppressed; on that, very great obstacles to the birth and rearing of children and their education, many occasions of quarrels and seeds of jealousy sown everywhere. Finally, but especially, the dignity and position of women in civil and domestic society is reinstated by the former; while by the latter it is shamefully lowered and the danger is incurred of their being considered outcasts, slaves of the lust of men."

Considering the exceptional importance of this matter, it seems worth while to sum up in a synoptic form the teachings which we have just transcribed.

Indissolubility: Marriages peaceful and secure.

Divorce: Unions made precarious by even the distant prospect of divorce, and by suspicions easily aroused.

Indissolubility: Mutual good will strengthened.

Divorce: Good will weakened.

Indissolubility: Guarantees of chaste fidelity.

Divorce: Harmful temptations to infidelity offered.

Indissolubility: Birth and education of children protected.

Divorce: Birth and education of children compromised.

Indissolubility: Door closed against discord between families.

Divorce: Many occasions of discord.

Indissolubility: Seeds of discord nipped in the bud.

Divorce: Seeds of discord growing to bitterness.

Indissolubility: Dignity and position of woman upheld in society and the home.

Divorce: Humiliation of women, often irreparable. "After having ministered to the passions of their husbands they are in danger of being considered as outcasts." - Pope Leo XIII, "Arcanum"

160. What Other Consequence Does Divorce Entail?

It is the open road to the decay of morals, and leads to an ever-increasing number of broken homes.

161. What Final Remark Does the Encyclical Make of the Subject of Divorce?

It notes the justice of the forecast made by Leo XIII, the unheard-of degradation of the family where Communism is in control.

- text taken from What Is Marriage? - A Catechism Arranged According to the Encyclical "Casti Connubii" of Pope Pius XI, by A. Vermeersch, S.J.; it has the Imprimatur of Cardinal Patrick Hayes, Archbishop of New York, 10 December 1931; for all the sections of this catechism, see the table of contents; the book and the encyclical are available for download in a free ebook