Chapter 103 - Of the Government of Things in General

The opinion of certain philosophers who ascribe everything to chance is absurd; for we see that in most cases what is best nearly always happens, and this would not be the case unless natural things were directed by some providence to a good end, as the order of Nature demonstrates.

The same is also evident from a consideration of the Divine Goodness, which called things into being. For it belongs to the Best to produce that which is best, and to lead it to perfection; and the ultimate perfection of a thing is attained by the prosecution of the end, i.e. by right government. And the end of the government of the world must be a good external to the universe; for since the principle of things was external to the universe, the end, which corresponds with the beginning, must be so also. It is plain, moreover, that since universal good is the end of all things, such good cannot be anything less than the universe. For a particular end is found in some particular good, which is good by participation, but the universal end is that which is good in itself and by essence; hence the good which is the end of the whole universe must be something external to it.

The world, moreover, is governed by One; for since the world's government is essential good, such government must be the best, and by the Best, i.e. by One. For every government tends to unity, and this unity is better attained by one than by several, because the cause of unity is in itself one; nor are many ever the cause of one, except in as far as they are in some way united. The best government is therefore by one; hence the philosopher says: "Beings are never wrongly disposed, therefore there is one head."

And since the effect of an action is to be measured by its end, and the end of the world's government is essential good, the effect may be considered in three ways. First, on the part of the end; and thus it is assimilation to the highest good. Secondly, as to the means by which creatures are assimilated to God; and in this regard we find, speaking generally, two effects of government, inasmuch as God is good, and the creature is good; and, as being a cause of goodness to others, one creature moves another to goodness: hence there are two effects of government, viz. the conservation of creatures in good, and their movement towards good. Thirdly, the effects of government may be considered individually, and thus we find them to be innumerable, according to the diverse nature of things.

For all things are subject to the Divine Government, since it belongs to the same power to produce them, and to bring them to perfection; and because God is the Universal Cause of being, and nothing exists which was not created by Him, so also nothing escapes His government.

The same appears evidently from a consideration of the end; for since the Goodness of God is the proper end of the government of the universe, nothing can exist which is not ordered thereto. Hence the opinion that particular and inferior things are not governed by God is absurd.

But two things are essential to government, viz. the plan and the execution of it, and with regard to the former God governs all things immediately; for since He is Essential Goodness everything is to be attributed to Him in the most perfect manner, which demands that in all departments every particular be known to Him. For the best physician is he who takes account, not only of universals, but can enter into the smallest details; hence we must admit that God's care extends to the least particulars.

As regards the execution, however, a government is better in proportion as it communicates greater perfection to the governed; therefore God so governs as that some become causes in the government of others; - as a master, who should make his scholars not only wise themselves, but teachers of others.

Thus it is impossible that anything should occur outside the order of the Universal Cause, and the Divine Government comprehends all beings; nevertheless something may happen contrary to a particular cause, because some other cause, having a contingent effect, was not subject to it. So indigestion may take place in spite of the nutritive organs, through the accident of food having been too heavy; and this is called evil, because it is contrary to the order of a particular good; but if evil went wholly beyond the order of the Divine Government it would cease to exist; for evil is always grounded in good, and nothing is wholly bad.

Thus nothing reacts against the general order of Divine Government; for all things tend to good, and nothing aims at evil in its operation, because the inclination of everything, whether natural or voluntary, is nothing but an impulse received from the First Mover, as an arrow from the archer. And thus everything which acts, comes as it were spontaneously to that which is divinely ordained. Hence God is said to "order all things sweetly."