Chapter 041 - Of Persons as Compared with Notional Acts

Notional Acts are to be attributed to the Divine Persons because we find in them distinction of Origin, and by these acts the Order of Origin is suitably designated. But the conception of Origin in Divine things is twofold. As regards that of creatures proceeding from God, it is common to the Three Persons; hence the actions attributed to God which refer to the procession of creatures pertain to the Essence. But we find another conception of Origin as regards the Procession of Person from Person; and to this belong notional acts which indicate the Order of Origin and the relation of one Person to Another.

And inasmuch as there are two ways in which a thing may be called voluntary - one by concomitance, the other causally - we say that the Father begets the Son by the first, i.e. with concomitance of Will, inasmuch as by His Will He is God; while, by the second, i.e. causally, He does not beget the Son, but produces creatures. And this, because will differs from nature in the causation of things; for nature is determined to one thing, but will not so; because will does not act by one form only, but by many, since there are many intellectual forms. Will is the source, therefore, of those things which might be other than they are, but the Being of God is necessary, hence the Father begets His Son not by Will, but by Nature.

This necessity of Nature is not a defect, as death and such-like with us; for there is no such necessity in God, and all things are created as He wills them to be; but the Son born of God subsists such as God is. For the Son is not begotten from nothing, but from the Substance of the Father.

If He were produced from nothing He would stand in the relation of that which is made to the maker, and it would follow that He was created, and not a proper and true Son; the contrary of which we read in 1 John 5:20: "That we may be in His true Son." Therefore the Son is Begotten, not made; and if those who are made by God from nothing are called sons, it is by assimilation to Him Who is the true Son, Begotten and by Nature, while others are called sons by adoption. Therefore the Son is of the Substance of the Father; differently, however, from the sons of men, in whom part of the substance of the father who begets passes into that of the son who is begotten. For the Divine Nature is indivisible; consequently God the Father, in generating, does not transfuse a part of His Nature, but communicates the whole; and the only distinction which remains is that of Origin.

In consequence of the manner in which notional acts are admitted in the Divinity, we must admit also a faculty in respect of such acts; for faculty signifies simply the principle of an act; therefore, as we understand the Father to be the Principle of Generation, and the Father and the Son of Spiration, we must attribute to the Father the faculty of Generation, and to Both that of Spiration. The faculty of generation, indeed, signifies, in any one, that in virtue of which he generates; hence in every generator we must admit a faculty of generating, and for spiration a faculty of breathing.

This faculty of generation does not, however, signify relation in God, because it refers principally to the Essence; and in any agent that is properly called faculty in virtue of which it acts. Now, whatever produces anything by its action produces that which is like to itself in respect of the form by which it acts; so a man generated is similar to the generator in that human nature by virtue of which the father could generate; but the Son of God is like to the Father, Who generates in Divine Nature, therefore the faculty of Generating which exists in the Father is the Divine Nature Itself; and it follows that the faculty of Generation signifies the Divine Nature absolutely, and Paternity only secondarily, by relation to what is generated; for the Father generates by virtue of the Divine Nature, which is common to the Father and to the Son.

And in the Divinity there is One Father only, One Son, and One Holy Spirit; for which four reasons may be assigned: first, because Relations, which, in the Divinity, are nothing else than Divine Persons, cannot be so multiplied that there should be several Paternities or Filiations; for the form of a species cannot be multiplied except according to quantity, which does not exist in God. The second reason is evident from the mode of the Processions; for God knows and wills all by one simple act, hence there can be only one Person proceeding by mode of the Word, that is the Son; and one by that of Love, which is the Holy Ghost. The third reason is taken from the mode of Those proceeding; for the Divine Persons proceed naturally, and nature is determined to one thing. The fourth reason appears from the perfection of the Divine Persons; for the Son is perfect inasmuch as He contains in Himself the plenitude of Divine Filiation, which is One Son only. The same is to be said of the other Persons.

- text taken from Compendium of the Summa Theologica of Saint Thomas Aquinas, by Bishop Berardus Bongiovanni